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The credit channel of monetary policy has both cross-sectional and time-
series implications for the reaction of the economy to monetary shocks. This
paper focuses on the more rarely investigated time-series aspect and shows
that the economy has varying sensitivity to monetary shocks over time. By
using a Threshold VAR model, we …nd that output and credit spreads react
much stronger to monetary shocks when cash ‡ows or dividends are low. This
distinction in theregimes isin particularmoresigni…cant than one based on the
stage of the business cycle or on the stance of monetary policy. In this sense,
the response to a tightening for instance cannot be considered as constant and
traditional impulse-response functions have to be taken with some caution.
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11 Introduction
The traditional interest rate channel of monetary policy has been shown to have only
modest e¤ects on the real economy. In this framework, it appears di¢cult to explain
how small changes in interest rates would be able to trigger important responses in
the economy. As a response to this argument, economists have been looking for other
channels of transmission of monetary policy, which could complement the traditional
one and magnify the reaction of the economy. One important direction that has
been investigated attributes a central role to the presence of imperfections on credit
markets. Authors such as Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [7] have developed models
where next to the traditional interest rates channel, a credit channel is also present
and act as a …nancial accelerator. Following the presence of imperfections on the
credit market, a tightening of monetary policy which produces a deterioration of
…rm’s net worth, is also reducing their capacity to raise funds and therefore ampli…es
the reaction of the economy.
The credit channel setup has both cross-sectional and time-series implications.
First, as …rms are heterogeneous in terms of …nancial capacity, they should also be
a¤ected to a varying degree by a monetary policy shock. Second, as net worth varies
over time, the whole economy should be a¤ected di¤erently over time by a monetary
policy shock. Thecross-sectional side has beeninvestigatedquiteintensively inpapers
such as Gertler and Gilchrist [26] or Fisher [19], whereas the time-series implications
have received much less attention. Traditional studies characterising the response of
the economy to a monetary policy shock and notably those basedon VARframework,
see for instance Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [12] or Bernanke and Blinder [3],
have assumed that the response of the economy is constant over time. Some authors,
seefor instance GarciaandSchaller [24], Weise [52] orChoi [11]have adressed the issue
of time-varying response of the economy but this has never been done in connection
with the credit channel of monetary policy.
The objective of this paper is tocharacterizetheresponse over time of theeconomy
to a monetary policy shock using the implications of the credit channel of monetary
policy. We will in particular use this latter framework to try to identify criteria
in order to determine what are the periods where …nancial constraints have been
more severe. We will then investigate whether the reaction to monetary policy in
these periods is signi…cantly di¤erent than in periods where …rms are less …nancially
constraint. For this purpose, we will make an extensive use of credit spreads. It has
been shown by some authors (see Gertler and Lown [27] or Gertler, Hubbard and
Kashyap [25]) that credit spreads play a central role in the credit channel framework
as a proxy for agency costs. This arises because the presence of imperfections on
credit markets creates a wedge between the cost of internal and external …nance.
The econometric framework we use is a threshold vector autoregression (TVAR).
This kind of model has been …rst put forth by authors such as Tong [49] and [50] or
Potter [41]. It has the advantage of allowing for non-linear relationships between the
2variables. This is done by de…ning di¤erent regimes so that the model is composed of
di¤erent piece-wise linear processes but is globally non-linear. The structure of the
underlying VAR follows most of the literature on the e¤ects of monetary policy and
in particular the identi…cation scheme of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [12].
Results showthat the response of the economy to a monetary policy shock cannot
be considered as constant and that there are considerable asymmetries over time.
In particular, we show that the reaction is substantially stronger when cash ‡ows
are low or when dividends are low. These periods are supposed to be time where
…nancial constraints bind the most. The results are therefore in accordance with
the implications of the credit channel of monetary policy. Moreover, cash ‡ows and
dividends seem to be better proxy to identify periods of …nancial constraints than
industrial production or the stance of monetary policy.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
of the existing literature related to the present issue. Section 3 presents a simple
model of the credit channel and shows why this type of model should gives raise
to asymmetries over time in the response of aggregate variables and credit spreads.
Section 4 presents the empirical model and section 5 the results of the tests. Finally,
section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature
There are two types of literature, which are closely related to the present topic.
The …rst one deals with the transmission channels of monetary policy. In particular
it adds new mechanisms which can complement the traditional view of monetary
policy and therefore enhance the e¤ects on the real economy. The second part of the
literature investigates theresponse of the economy tomonetary shocks. It emphasizes
the reasons why monetary policy might have assymetric e¤ects on the economy and
draws some empirical implications.
2.1 The credit channel of monetary policy
2.1.1 The credit view
An enormous amount of literature has been devoted to the investigation of e¤ects of
monetary policy onthe real economy. According tothe traditional view, acontraction
of monetary policy in‡uences the economy trough an increase in the cost of capital
and thus has a dampening e¤ect on activities such as investment and the purchase
of durable goods. While it has been empirically acknowledged that there are some
e¤ects, at least in the short term, see e.g. Friedman and Schwartz [21], Romer and
Romer [44], Bernanke and Blinder [3] or Christiano et al. [12], authors have also
3noticed that changes in interest rates are small with respect to the alleged e¤ects1.
Therefore, part of the literature has focused on exploring alternative transmission
mechanisms for monetary policy, which could complement the traditional view of
monetary policy. The objective was to explain how relatively small shifts in interest
rates could be at the origin of a sustained response of the economy.
The main response of academics was a new transmission mechanism called the
credit channel of monetary policy. The leading contributions in this …eld have
been brought by authors such as Greenwald and Stiglitz [30], Bernanke and Gertler
[4], Carlstrom and Fuerst [9], Kiyotaki and Moore [37] and Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist [7]. This alternative view of monetary policy assigns a central role to the
presence of imperfections on the credit market due especially to information asymme-
tries between agents. Indeed, the presence of asymmetric information leads to a gap
between the cost of internal funds and the cost of obtaining …nance from outside. Be-
ing unable to observe all the relevant information, lenders will require a premium to
make funds available, compensating for the risks linked to adverse selection or moral
hazard problems. The di¤erence in the cost between internal and external funds will
be a function of the …nancial position of the borrower. The healthier the position of
the borrower is, the smaller the premium required by the lender. Therefore, in this
context, the …nancial position of the …rm matters and the Modigliani-Miller theorem
does not hold anymore. In this framework, monetary policy will have an impact
through its e¤ect on the balance sheet of the borrower. In general, a contraction of
monetary policy leads to a lower net worth of the …rm by, for instance, lowering the
value of collateral assets. In so doing, the borrower faces less favourable conditions
for …nancing its project and decreases the scale of its investment plans. Therefore,
monetary policy will a¤ect not only the level of interest rates (traditional view), but
also the size of the external …nance premium.
Among themostrecentcontributions, thepaperby Bernanke, GertlerandGilchrist
[7] is certainly one of the most comprehensive and representative of this literature.
Their paper illustrates a general equilibrium model in which credit market imperfec-
tions have beenendogeneized. The presence ofimperfections propagatesandampli…es
the e¤ects of both nominal and real shocks, giving rise to a ”…nancial accelerator”
e¤ect. In this setting, imperfections on the credit markets arise because the pres-
ence of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers implies agency costs.
Due to the presence of agency costs, intermediaries will require a premium to …nance
…rms. This premium is inversely related to the net worth of entrepreneurs. In turn,
changes in net worth happen mostly through changes in the price of capital, but also
through changes in entrepreneurial income. Therefore net worth is procyclical. As a
consequence, a positive shock to the economy is ampli…ed because it also improves
the net worth of the …rm, thereby facilitating the possibility to obtain credit. In a
…nal step, the authors integrate this mechanism ina sticky price model and showthat
1For a review of the weaknesses in the conventional view of monetary transmission, one should
refer to Bernanke and Gertler [5].
4monetary policy shocks are ampli…ed by the presence of credit market imperfections.
Other relevant contributions of the same type are found in Kiyotaki and Moore
[37] and Carlstrom and Fuerst [9]. Kiyotaki and Moore emphasized the role played
by changes in asset prices in the determinationof credit conditions. In a model where
landis used as collateral, they showfor instance that a negative shock to the economy
lowers the value of land and therefore the value of collateral. This is equivalent to
a tightening of credit conditions and impacts the reaction of …rms. Carlstrom and
Fuerst on the other hand uses the same type of model as Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist [7] andillustrate that it is able to generate hump-shaped responses of output
to shocks.
2.1.2 Empirical evidence
Following the emergence of these new models, academics have also started to investi-
gate empirical evidence on the credit channel of monetary policy. These studies can
be classi…ed in two main streams.
The …rst type of approach focuses on the cross-sectional implications of the credit
channel. Indeed, if the …nancial position of the borrower matters, then …rms with
di¤erent balance sheets should be impacted di¤erently by a monetary shock. In par-
ticular, Gertler and Gilchrist [26] and Fisher [19] show that small …rms are relatively
more a¤ected by a shock. In this study, sales, inventories and debt of small US
manufacturing …rms react more strongly than those of large …rms. In the same vein,
Perez-Quiros and Timmermann [40] show that small …rms’ stock returns display a
higher sensitivity to variables representative of credit market conditions. Moreover,
the sensitivity of small …rms is particularly enhanced during recession periods. In
another interesting paper, Ehrmann [16] extends the study of Gertler and Gilchrist
to Germany and …nds similar results. He also shows that the distributional asym-
metries are enhanced in periods of weak activity. Finally, one must also mention the
important literature related to the seminal paper by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
[18]. In this paper, the authors try to show that companies facing large …nancial con-
straints, and therefore more disposed to rely on external …nance, will be less sensitive
to investent opportunities. This happens because expansion is more expensive using
external …nance than it is using internal funds. As a proxy for the degree of …nancial
constraint of a …rm, they use the level of dividends paid. A company paying a higher
dividend is supposed to be less liquidity constrained and have more internal funds
at its disposal. Thus, …rms paying higher dividends are less sensitive to …nancial
constraints.
The second type of approach works with aggregate data, focusing on the amount
of credit levered by the economy over time. Bernanke and Blinder [3] have looked at
the information content of changes in the federal funds rates and their impact of the
economy. In a …rst stage, they …nd that federal funds rates is an appropriate measure
of monetary policy and that it provides substantial information about the future evo-
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showing that loans react substantially to changes in monetary policy. Furthermore,
the reaction of loans corresponds in timing to the reaction of employment. A second
important paper is the one by Kashyap, Steinand Wilcox [36]. These authors investi-
gate the developments of the mix between bank loans and commercial paper issuance
following a monetary shock. They …nd that, following a contraction of monetary
policy, issues of commercial paper increase and bank loans decline. They interpret
this movement as a shrinking credit supply from banks and therefore evidence for the
credit channel of monetary policy. Moreover, they illustrate that the mix betweenthe
two variables helps predict future movements in inventories and investment. How-
ever, some authors have disputed the interpretation of changes in the mix as evidence
for the credit channel. Indeed, Oliner and Rudebush [38] and Friedman and Kuttner
[20] have argued that shifts in the mix are due mainly to ‡uctuations in the issue of
commercial papers by large …rms rather than to a contraction in bank loans during
recessions.
All in all, one can note that evidence using aggregate data is rather scarce and
mitigated with respect to what has been done on a cross-sectional basis.
2.1.3 The role of credit spreads
Theliteraturementioned aboveattributes akey role inthe transmissionmechanismto
the gap in the cost between external and internal …nance. Following this implication,
numerous authors have identi…ed the spread between risky interest rates and risk-free
rates as a goodproxy of theexternal …nancepremium. In thewakeof thisassumption,
they have tried to characterize the behavior of credit spreads, both at the short and
at the long end of the curve.
Gertler, Hubbard andKashyap [25] develop a framework where …nancial contract-
ing between lenders and borrowers includes asymmetric information. Very much in
the same vein as the Bernanke and Gertler [4] model, the adverse selection problem
arising from the presence of imperfections in the credit market gives raise to a wedge
between the cost of internal and external …nance.This gap is estimated through the
use of the di¤erence between six-month commercial paper and Treasury bill rates.
The authors then show that, in accordance with the credit channel, movements in
agency costs play a signi…cant role in amplifying investment ‡uctuations. Interest
rates spreads are then shown to signal e¢ciently movements in these agency costs.
These results therefore shed some light on the reason why interest rate spreads help
to predict future investment and output ‡uctuations.
More recently, Gertler and Lown [27], focusing on the high yield bond market
since the beginning of the eighties, con…rm the predictive power of credit spreads
with respect to output ‡uctuations. They also argue that the spread between high
yieldbond rates and risk-free rates can be interpretedas a measure of overall …nancial
conditions and more particularly of the premium for external funds. Furthermore,
6they show that, in the recent period, interest rate spreads have outperformed other
traditional …nancial indicators such as the term spreads or fed funds in forecasting
economic activity. The authors argue that this change in forecasting power is linked
to the change in US monetary policy after the Volcker period between 1979 and 1982.
Finally let us also mention a very large literature focusing on the predicting power
of …nancial variables with respect to future economic ‡uctuations. A large number
of these studies have included credit spreads in the set of forecasting variables and
have found them to help signi…cantly in predicting future real variables. Some of the
main papers in this area are Stock and Watson [46] or Estrella and Mishkin [17].
2.2 The response to monetary policy
2.2.1 The traditional view
The background of the model we will use in this paper is the literature which deals
with the empirical investigation of the e¤ects of monetary policy on the economy.
In particular, there is a series of papers, which uses a VAR system and the ensuing
impulse-response functions to simulate the reaction of some variables to a monetary
shocks. With respect to our study, some key papers are Bernanke and Blinder [3],
Sims [45], Strongin [47] or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [12]. We have already
mention the Bernanke and Blinder [3] paper in the previous section and said that one
of its main …nding is to show that fed funds rates are certainly a good proxy, if not
the best, in order to identify monetary shocks. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
[12] rely on the same type of framework, but use the ‡ow of funds statistics. They
show in particular that a contraction of monetary policy leads on one hand to a fall in
some monetary agregates such as nonborrowed reserves or M1 money supply and on
the other hand to a persistent decline in some economic agregates such as real GNP,
employment and retail sales. They also show that, in the aftermath of the monetary
contraction, net funds raised by the corporate sector rise for roughly a year, but then
decline as the policy shock gains momentum. Using nonborrowed reserves instead
of fed funds rate as a proxy for monetary policy, Strongin [47] show that monetary
shocks have a strong liquidity e¤ect and therefore it explains most of output variance
in a two years horizon.
As it will become clear inwhat follows, we believe that one of the drawback of this
literature is that it assumes that the reaction of the variables investigated is constant
over time. Following the intuition given by the credit channel, we will show that the
impulse-responses described in this literature can indeed hide substantial shifts over
time, depending in particular on how tight general …nancial conditions are.
2.2.2 The presence of asymmetries
As a matter offact, there is already some literature dealing withthe possible presence
of asymmetries in the response of the economy to monetary shocks. Some authors
7have argued that avariety of economic theories imply that the economy should adjust
asymmetrically to exogenous shocks. This is the case of models with sticky wages,
sticky prices or menu costs for instance. Therefore, empirical researchers have in-
vestigated the presence of asymmetries in the response of di¤erent real variables to
exogenous disturbances such as demand shocks or monetary shocks.
Cover [15] looks at the impact of money-supply shocks on output in the US in the
after-war period. He observes that positive money-supply shocks have no e¤ect on
output, whereas negative money-supply shocks causeoutput to decline. He alsoshows
that negative shocks have larger e¤ects. In the same spirit, Rhee and Rich [43] and
Karras and Stokes [34] con…rm these results and notice that the asymmetries are ex-
acerbated in periods of high in‡ation. They also show that the asymmetric responses
apply particularly to investment, whereas consumption responds more symmetrically.
Following these papers, Ravn and Sola [42] showthat the most relevant asymmetry is
to be found between big and small changes rather than between positive and negative
changes. Their paper illustrate that small shocks have real e¤ects, while big shocks
are mostly neutral. Garcia andSchaller [24] explore the asymmetric e¤ects of changes
in interest rates. They …nd that changes in interest rates have larger e¤ects during
recessions than during expansion phases. Moreover, interest rates and spreads with
risky interest rates have signi…cant e¤ects on the probability of changes in regimes
between recessions and expansions. A recent paper by Weise [52] goes very much
in the same direction by showing that money-supply shocks have larger e¤ects when
output growth is initially low. Finally, Choi [11] …nds that the e¤ects of changes in
the money-supply on interest rates vary signi…cantly across monetary policy stances.
3 The Model
3.1 Theoretical background
There has been numerous versions of the credit channel of monetary policy. Whereas
authors have used di¤erent frameworks, they all share a few common conclusions.
First, external …nance is more expensive than internal …nance. Second, the premium
of external …nance varies inversely with net worth of the entrepreneur. Finally, a
negative shock reducing a borrower’s net worth, reduces as well spending through
an increase in the external …nance premium. These results are most easily seen
with the following simple partial equilibrium model drawn from Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist [6]. Assume there are two periods, 0 and 1. The entrepreneur has a
technology where he can produce using a …xed factor K (already in place) and a
variable input X (to be acquired). The …xed factor can be sold at the end of period
1 at a market price Q1. Output in period 1 is
A1f (X1)
8where A1 is a technology parameter. At the beginning of the period, the …rm has a
gross cash ‡ow A0f (X0) and debt R0B0 where R0 is the gross interest rate on the
debt. The budget constraint for the entrepreneur is therefore
X1 = A0f (X0)+ B1 ¡ R0B0 (1)
which means that the quantity of input purchased must be equal to previous period
net cash ‡ow plus new borrowing. Consequently, the entrepreneur chooses X1 and
B1 in order to maximize period 1 output net of debt repayment. Suppose now that
K serves as collateral for new borrowings, i.e. the ownership of K is transferred to
the lender if the borrower does not pay his debt. In this case, the purchase of variable
input is limited by the present value of K, i.e.
B1 · (Q1=R1)K (2)
Combining the last two equations yields the following
X1 = A0f (X0)+ (Q1=R1)K ¡R0B0 (3)
This last equation emphasizes the main results mentioned above. When the …nancial
constraint binds, spending X1 is below the optimum and A1f0(X1) > R1. The
di¤erence between these two terms can be interpreted as an implicit measure of
agency costs. As net worth declines, the company is more severely constrained,
spending is lower and agency costs are increasing. As a result, agency costs vary
inversely with net worth. One of the main implication of this equation is that it
leads to an asymmetry in the reaction to external shocks both cross-sectional and
over time. On a cross-sectional basis, …rms with a lower level of net worth will have
to pay a higher premium to …nance investment and will therefore be more …nancially
constrained. On a time-series perspective, there are periods inwhich the general level
of net worth is lower. Therefore, in these periods, the economy is likely to be more
constrained …nancially and consequently more sensitive to external shocks. In the
rest of the paper, we will focus on this second aspect.
The interesting side of equation (3) is that it provides good hints of how to de-
termine a period of …nancial constraint. By looking at the right-hand side of the
equation, you see that the di¤erent factors that can a¤ect net worth. First, a change
in net worth can happen through changes in cash ‡ow linked to the previous period
business. Second, it can happen through a fall in the price of asset prices, Q1 in this
case. Third, it might happen through a rise in interest rates which in turn increases
the debt burden and lowers the price of assets.
Following the intuition containedinequation (3), authors have in turn emphasized
these di¤erent channels of ‡uctuations in net worth. The most simple process, such
as in Carlstrom and Fuerst [9] for instance, directly links net worth to the evolution of
output through an elasticity coe¢cient. This coe¢cient is positive so that net worth
in this case is procyclical.
N = N (output) (4)
9Kyiotaki and Moore [37] put more emphasis on the e¤ect of changing asset prices on
net worth.
N = N (assetprices) (5)
This happens in particular because …nancial assets are used as collateral by …rms in
order to obtain external …nance. Another possibility is given by Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist [7], who provide us with a more sophisticated process where net worth
is a function of both …rm’s cash ‡owand entrepreneur wage. Cash ‡ows are the most
important part and is determined by both retained earnings and changes in the value
of capital. In this case we have
N = N(assetprices; cashflows) (6)
Finally, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [18] assume that …rms that pay more divi-
dends are less likely to be …nancially constrained. In this case, the level of dividends
would be a good proxy for the …nancial soundness of the …rm
N = N (dividends) (7)
3.2 The channel of monetary policy
These processes for the determination of net worth provides us with insights in the
way monetary policy can impact net worth and in turn the external …nance premium.
Indeed, Bernanke and Gertler [5] have classi…ed the e¤ects as direct and indirect.
Direct e¤ects of monetary policy are of two kinds. The …rst one is linked to the
debt burden. When monetary policy is tight, interest rates are high and …rms see
their interest rate charges increase. This expands the debt burden, lowers cash ‡ow
and thus weakens the balance sheet. Second, increasing interest rates are usually
linked to declining asset prices. In turn, this leads to weaker value of the assets of
the …rm.
Moreover, monetary policy also has an indirect e¤ect on borrowers’ balance sheet.
A tightening of monetary policy is generally linked with slowing economic activity
and therefore …rms will face declining sales. On the other hand, costs are slow to
adjust, so that, for some time, margins will be under pressure and cash ‡ows weaker.
This in turn weakens the balance sheet conditions of the …rms.
The e¤ects of monetary policy can also be understood with the use of …gures
1 and 2. In the …rst …gure, one can see how the credit channel is functionning in
relation to the traditional view of monetary policy. The demand for investment
is represented by the curve D and the supply of funds by curve S. The later is
horizontal at the level of the risk-free rate Rf as long as investment is covered by
internal funds N. After that, the company has to borrow and will have to pay an
external …nance premium. This premium is increasing with the amount borrowed.
At the equilibrium E, investment is I, funds borrowed are I ¡ N and the interest
charged is Rb. The external …nance premium is therefore P = Rb ¡ Rf. In the
10traditional money view, a tightening of monetary policy, represented by an upward
shift in risk-free rates, moves the supply curve to S0, so that investment declines to
I0. However, since changes in balance sheet conditions are not taken into account,
the external …nance premium remains roughly unchanged and plays no role in the
transmission channel. On the contrary, in the credit view of monetary policy, the
supply curve moves to S00, so that the spread this time increases from P to P00. The
reason for this increase is twofold. First, as monetary conditions become tighter, the
level of net worth diminishes from N to N00 so that the kink of the supply curve is
moved to the left. Second, the level of interest rates is also a¤ecting the premium
and shifts the slope of the curve upward. This happens because, even if the current
level of net worth remains unchanged, the lender would require a higher premium in
order to compensate for a higher probability of default in the future. This increase in
the probability of default arises because after a monetary contraction, the economy
is expected to be weaker, a¤ecting therefore future cash ‡ows of the …rm. As a
result, the e¤ect of the monetary shock is ampli…ed and production declines futher
to I00 < I0. This mechanism is called the …nancial accelerator.
In …gure 2, we try to show why the reaction of the economy should vary according
to the state of the net …nancial position of the …rm. In fact, it might happen that
in some cases, even in the presence of a credit channel, the increase in the spread
is minor. This would happen if the contraction of monetary policy happens at a
time where balance sheets are very sound and net worth is high. For instance, the
contraction could enter in a period where cash ‡ows are generous or when asset prices
are very high. In this case, the risk of lending is increased only marginally, so that
the premium required by borrower would not increase substantially. On the other
hand, if the tightening of monetary policy happens when cash ‡ows are already weak
or asset prices depressed, then this might increase dramatically the probability of
default of …rms, pushing the external premium much higher. As a result, whereas in
the baseline case the supply curve would shift to S0, it might be that in periods of
severe constraints, the curve shifts even further to S000. In this case, we would see the
spread increasing to P000 > P0 and output would decline more dramatically to I000. On
the other hand, in periods where …rms are less constrained, the reaction would be less
signi…cant and the supply curve would stay closer to the baseline case, for instance in
S00. The spread would then remain very low in P 00 and the reaction of output would
be rather muted to I00.
4 The empirical model
4.1 The baseline VAR
The benchmark linear model against which we will be testing for non-linearity is
a standard structural VAR, such as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [12] for
11instance. The model has the following form:
yt = c+ ©1yt¡1+ ©2yt¡2 + ::: + ©pyt¡p + "t (8)
where y is a vector of k variables included in the model, p is the number of lags, ©n
are the matrices of coe¢cients and "t is the vector of errors, assumed to be serially
uncorrelated with a variance-covariance matrix -. An alternative way to represent
the model, which will be useful later is the following:
yt = ©xt +"t (9)
where xt =
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In order to identify properly the shocks to monetary policy, we will assume that
the VAR disturbances "t are related to true economic shocks through the relation
"t = Sut (10)
with SS0 = - and where S is lower triangular and ut has a covariance matrix equal
to the identity matrix. Coe¢cients in this model will be estimated by ordinary least
squares, equation by equation. Thanks to the decomposition in 10, we will be able
to use the coe¢cients in order to look at the reaction of the variables to the true
economic shocks through the use of impulse-response functions.
4.2 Threshold VAR
The alternative model which allows for non-linearities is a threshold VAR (TVAR). It
was originally developped in an univariate setting by Tong [49] and [50] and extended
to a multivariate framework for instance by Choi [11]. In this model, one can allow
the relationship to be piece-wise linear, i.e. linear in speci…c regimes, but globally
non-linear. Regimes are determined by the position of a given variable with respect
to one or several thresholds. If one does not have an a-priori idea of the level of the
threshold, then the later is also estimated in the model using a grid search procedure
developed for instance in Hansen [31] and [32], Pesaran and Potter [39] or Choi [11].
The model we use is a TVAR with two regimes2 :
yt = (c1 + ©1yt¡1+ ©2yt¡2 + ::: + ©pyt¡p)I (¿t > ¿
¤) +
+(c2 +ª1yt¡1 + ª2yt¡2 +::: +ªpyt¡p)I (¿t < ¿¤)+ "t (11)
in which I (¢) denotes the indicator function, ¿t is the threshold variable and ¿¤ is the
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2A TVAR model with three regimes was also investigated. However, it did not provide additional
insights into the issue. Furthermore, responses are more noisy and di¢cult to interpret as regimes
are more di¢cult to distinguish.
12wherext and© havebeende…nedin the previous sectionandª =
¡
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The parameters are therefore the coe¢cients in each regime as well as the level of the
threshold ¿¤. For the former, the appropriate estimation method is again ordinary
least squares, equation by equation and regime by regime. For the threshold, and
since we have in some cases no ex-ante idea of what it shouldbe, Hansen [31] proposes
to determine it as the onewhich minimizes the determinant of the variance-covariance





with ¡ = [¿¤;¹ ¿¤]. The threshold is therefore determined through a grid search pro-
cedure.
4.3 Data
To estimate the model, we use monthly data ranging from January 1959 to December
2000. The choice of variables largely follows previous literature on the impact of
monetary shocks such as Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [12] or Strongin [47].
The vector of variables will therefore include the consumer prices in‡ation rate (P),
thecommodity prices in‡ation rate (PCOM), the interest rateon fed funds (FF), the
percentage ratioof non-borrowed reserves tototal reserves (NBR) and thepercentage
ratio of total reserves to total reserves in the previous period (TR). The use of the
index of commodity prices is motivated by the necessity to tackle the so-called ”price-
puzzle”, according to which a rise in fed funds is associated with a protracted rise
in consumer prices. Studies such as Sims [45] or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
[12] show that the introduction of an index of commodity prices allows for a more
traditional reaction of consumer prices to a monetary shock.
The objective of the paper is to look at the reaction of the economy to a monetary
shock, witha particular emphasison the evolutionofagregateoutput and the external
…nance premium. Therefore, in a …rst step, we will review the reaction ofa traditional
output variable and the log of industrial production (IP) will also be included in the
model. In a second step, we would like to assess the reaction of some proxies for the
external …nance premium, i.e. credit spread variables, tomonetary shocks. Therefore,
we will add to the model in turn the credit spread between bonds with Baa rating
and bonds with Aaa rating (CSBMA) and the spread between the 3 months prime
rate and 3 months T-Bills (CSPRI). The former investigates the reaction of spreads
at the long end of the curve. It was in particular used by Gertler and Lown [27] and
Gertler, Hubbard and Kashyap [25], who show that this variable is closely related to
the external …nance premium identi…ed in the theoretical section of this paper and
therefore canbe used as a goodproxyof it. Thesecondspreadis also informative since
it is computed on the short end of the curve and allows therefore for a comparison
also in the maturity of the instruments. This spread was used in a similar context in
particular by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [7] as a proxy for the external …nance
13premium as well.
The identi…cation of monetary shocks is done following the scheme of Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans [12] where monetary shocks are assimilated to shocks in fed
funds rates. This is in accordance with results in Bernanke and Blinder [3] where it
is shown that fed funds are a good proxy for monetary shocks3. The residuals of the
equation on fed funds can be observed in …gure 3. To get a better picture and since
residuals are by de…nition uncorrelated, we have plotted the centered three months
average of fed funds residuals. We have also added the recession periods as de…ned
by the NBER in shaded areas and the episodes of monetary tightening as identi…ed
by Romer and Romer [44] and reported in table 2. One can see that monetary policy,
as proxied by fed funds, use to be more restrictive in periods preceding recessions
and becomes more relaxed and the end of the recessions and beginning of expansion
periods. Note also the increased volatility of the residuals during the Volcker period,
i.e. approximately between 1978 and 1982.
As a consequence of this identi…cation scheme, we have used the following order-
ing of the variables : P, PCOM, FF, NBR, TR. The variable for which we want
to investigate the reaction, i.e. in turn IP, CSBMA, and CSPRI, will be added at
the …rst place. This ordering is consistent with the assumption that monetary shocks
have no contemporaneous e¤ect on output and price variables (see for instance Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [12]) and that credit spreads do contain some relevant
information for setting monetary policy4. The later assumption is indeed in accor-
dance with numerous studies mentioned previously, which highlight the predictive
power of credit spreads with respect to various agregate economic variables.
4.4 Threshold variables
For selecting the switchingvariables, we will make use ofthe insights we got insection
3. According to the intuition of the simple model presented, we select …ve di¤erent
switching variables.
Based on equation (4) and models such as the one developed by Carlstrom and
Fuerst [9], we will assume …rst that net worth is ‡uctuating in accordance with the
business cycle. Inthis sense, a variable used as proxy for the business cycle, industrial
production for instance will be appropriate. We therefore include the annual change5
in industrial production (IP) as one possibility for the switching variable. Another
possibility is given by equation (5), developed in papers such as Kyiotaki and Moore
3One possible alternative was presented by Strongin [47] where shocks are identi…ed with shocks
to non-borrowed reserves.
4Alternatively, and for robustness check, we have also used the ordering of Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist in which credit spreads come after the fed funds. This follows the assumption that
credit spreads do not contain relevant information in setting monetary policy. Results are mostly
unchanged.
5Annual changes, instead of monthly changes, will be used for the switching variables since it is
less volatile and allows for a clearer distinction between regimes.
14[37], where net worth is essentially a function of the price of assets. We thus introduce
annual changes in the S&P 500 (SP) as a proxy for asset prices changes and this will
be a second type of switching variable. Other papers, for instance Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist [7], determine net worth as in equation (6). In this case, net worth
‡uctuates mainly as a function of cash ‡ows of companies. We will therefore include
annual changes in cash ‡ows (CF) as indicated in the national accounts statistics
(NIPA) in our list for threshold variables. Other authors such as Fazzari, Hubbard
and Petersen [18] determine net worth as in equation (7). For this purpose, we use
as well the annual changes in dividends (DIV), also released in the NIPA statistics.
Finally, one can also argue that the stance of monetary policy might a¤ect the level
of net worth. As a matter of fact, when monetary policy is tight, interest charges
are high and asset prices are lower, which means that net worth will also be lower.
Thus, the last switching variable we consider is the Boschen-Mills index (BM), which
accounts for the stage of monetary policy. This index takes values of -1 or -2 when
monetary policy is tight, 1 or 2 when it is expansive and 0 when it is neutral. For
each variable except BM, we run the grid search from the 33% percentile to the
66% percentile so that sub-samples do always include at least one third of the full
sample67.
Table 1 gives some summary statistics about the threshold variables (expressed
in annual changes in percent). Furthermore, …gure 4 display the evolution of the
variables from the beginning of the sixties until December 2000. To get some more
insights in the relation to the business cycle and monetary policy, we have added
again in each chart in shaded areas the periods of recession as computed by the
NBER, together with monetary policy tightening episodes reported by Romer and
Romer [44]. By looking at the …rst chart in …gure 4, one can observe clearly that
phases of low industrial production correspond quite accurately to o¢cial phases of
recession. Indeed, every time that industrial production dropped below zero, then
an o¢cial recession was declared. Therefore, using industrial production is certainly
an accurate way to identify business cycles regimes. On the other hand, one can also
observe that the concomitance with the business cycle is not respected as faithfully
anymore when one looks at the other variables in …gure 4. Cash ‡ows, for instance,
where depressed also in other periods than the o¢cial recessions, such as around
1967, in the mid-eigthies or at the end of the nineties. Moreover, cash ‡ows where
rather improving during the last recession at the beginning of the nineties. The
same observation can be made for dividends. In 1967 for example, dividends plunged
dramatically while the economy was not o¢cially in recession. Identical cases can
be identi…ed around 1987 and 1992. These remarks are even more valid for stock
6In this case there is no estimation for the threshold since it is determined ex-ante.
7Another choice for the switching variables would have been to look at credit spreads, which can
be considered as a good proxy of agency costs. We have tried this alternative, but it proves di¢cult
to identify sensible regimes. This is mostly due to the fact that spreads have not been stationary
across the sample considered, i.e. the last 50 years.
15returns. As can be seen from table 1, they are, as expected, the most volatile series.
Moreover, we note that equity markets tend to weaken slightly before recessions and
improve before the end of recessions. This is due to the well-known property of
leading indicator of stock returns. Finally, as for the two previous variables, there are
several cases where returns were low while the economy was not o¢cially in recession.
The most obvious cases are 1963, 1967, 1978, 1987 and, last but not least, the very
recent episode of the end of 2000.
One can also see, when looking at Romer’s episodes, that the correspondence to
monetary policy is not identical for all variables neither. Indeed, whereas industrial
production seems to react with a certain lag, cash ‡ows and dividends seem to re-
act much more promptly to the tightening. Stock returns on the other hand have
generally weakened before the tightening and tend rather to improve afterward.
All in all, the observation of these charts lead us to conclude that regimes deter-
mined by cash ‡ows, dividends and stock returns will certainly not totally coincide
with the one determined by industrial production, i.e. the classical business cycle. It
will thus be interesting to see whether the former regimes are more signi…cant than
the later classical one.
Indeed, the regimes determined by the di¤erent threshold variables are described
in table 3 as well as in …gures 5 to 7. Table 3 gives for each threshold variable and
each level of the di¤erent thresholds determined in the systems, the number of low
regimes as well as the average length of both high and low regimes. One can note
…rst that the number of regimes is clearly not constant depending on the threshold
variable considered. For instance, the number of regimes is much higher when they
are determined by cash ‡ows or stock returns than it is when using the Boschen-
Mills index. Figures 5 to 7 plot the three variables of most interest together with
the regimes in shaded areas. Figure 5 for instance is a plot of industrial production,
with regimes determined according to all the threshold variables and with the levels
reported in table 4. Figures 6 and 7 do the same respectively for the credit spread
on long-term bonds (CSBMA) and the credit spread on the prime rate (CSPRI).
As described in table 3, one can note that dividends allow to determine much longer
low regime periods than the other variables. One further feature that will prove
important later is that dividends and cash ‡ows are the only variables which are still
…nding some low regimes in the nineties. Therefore, these …gures illustrate that there




The …rst step in order to assess the reaction of the investigated variables is to de-
termine whether the hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of the presence of
16a threshold is rejected or not. In order to test for the presence of asymmetry, one
could use the conventional test of equality of the coe¢cients among the regimes only
if the threshold is …xed a priori. This will be the case only for the BM variable in
our framework. When thresholds are not …xed ex-ante but rather determined endo-
geneously, authors such as Andrews and Ploberger [1] or Hansen [31] have shownthat
the conventional tests are not appropriate. This happens because of the presence of
a nuisance parameter which is not identi…ed under the null hypothesis. In this case,
the usual Wald statistic does not follow the standard chi-square distribution. The
same authors proposed a new procedure which allows to approximate the unknown
asymptotic distribution by simulations.
In the spirit of Hansen [31], [32], Andrews and Ploberger [1] and Pesaran and
Potter [39], we test for each equation included in the model the hypothesis of equality
in parameters among regimes.
H0 : © = ª (14)
As suggested more particularly by Andrews and Ploberger [1], one can then com-
pute three statistics which are functionals of the collection of Wald statistics over
the grid space. Those are the supremum, the average and the exponential average.
Signi…cance levels are then computed using simulated empirical distributions.
Table 4 presents the results of the tests for the equations which are of particular
interest for us, i.e. those which determine credit spreads and industrial production.
Thelast column alsoindicates thelevel of thethresholddeterminedinthemodel. One
can observe that the hypothesis of equality of coe¢cients among regimes is clearly
rejected at all signi…cance levels. Therefore, these tests provide considerable evidence
that there is a shift in the coe¢cients across regimes. This is valid when the regimes
are determined according to all variables, be it cash ‡ow variables, output variable
or stock prices. Moreover, as far as credit spreads are concerned, the asymmetry is
valid both at the short and the long end of the curve.
5.2 Impulse - responses
Notwithstanding the presenceof non-linearity in the model, it is not yet …xedwhether
the reaction of the variables to monetary shocks is di¤erent across regimes. Indeed, it
might happenthat coe¢cients are altered in a way such that e¤ects are compensating
each other, leaving therefore the reaction to a monetary shock unchanged. Moreover,
non-linearities might arise mainly from coe¢cients not linked to monetary policy,
whereas coe¢cients on fed funds are only marginally non-linear. These issues can be
investigated through the use of impulse response functions. The case of interest will
obviously be the reaction of industrial production and credit spreads to a shock on
fed funds.
175.2.1 Baseline case
We start by reviewing the reaction of variables to monetary shocks in the full sample.
Those canbe observed in …gure 8. As expected, industrial production falls inreaction
to a contraction of monetary policy. Indeed it rises slightly in the …rst three months
but then starts to decline for an extended period of time. More interesting and in
accordance with …ndings of Gertler, Hubbard and Kashyap [25], Gertler and Lown
[27] or Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [7], we …nd that credit spreads also rise in
reaction to an increase in fed funds. Indeed, as noted by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist [7] this is already a …rst evidence in favor of the credit channel of monetary
policy, since it highlights the fact that companies with lower credit ratings, and
therefore less sound balance sheets, are more hardly hit by a contraction of monetary
policy. Furthermore, one can note that the shape of the reaction is quite di¤erent
according to the type of credit spread considered. The spread on short-term rates
tend to increase much quicker and stronger than the spread on long-term rates. On
the other hand, the persistence of the reaction is larger for long-term spreads. The
maximum reaction on short-term rates is to be found after three months whereas
the maximum e¤ect on long-term rates is reached after about two years. Finally,
one should also observe that the amplitude of the reaction of spreads on short-term
rates is much more important than the one on long-term rates. Indeed, the spread
on prime rates reaches a maximum of more than 20 basis points, whereas the spread
on long-term bonds rises only by 4 basis points at the peak. One reason for this
might simply be that the short end of the curve is generally much more volatile and
sensitive than the long end.
5.2.2 Non-linear case
What we want to investigate further is the issue of asymmetrical responses depending
on regimes over time. This is done by looking further at …gures 9 to 13 where the
impulse responses of credit spreads and industrial production are plotted according
to the regimes. Curves denoted with a H (long-dashed lines) represent the reaction
when we are in a high regime (¿t > ¿¤) whereas the curves denoted with a L (short-
dashed lines) represent the reaction in the low regime (¿t < ¿¤). The level of the
threshold for each case is shown in table 4. For reference, we have added in each
…gure the reaction for the full sample described in the previous section. It will be
denoted by a F (solid lines). The …rst intuition that one can probably have is that
the reaction of variables di¤er according to the stage of the business cycle. It is
therefore interesting to deal with the case where regimes are determined according
to industrial production …rst. In …gure 9, one can observe that there is indeed a
di¤erent reaction depending on the stage of the business cycle. Credit spreads on the
long end of the curve do react stronger when industrial production is growing slowly
or even contracting. This is indeed again in accordance with the credit channel
of monetary policy where companies are more severely a¤ected when their internal
18situation is not very healthy. This is more likely to happen when aggregate output
is not evolving strongly. However, this is more to be observed after a few months
whereas the immediate short-term reaction is not very di¤erent. On the long-term,
the di¤erence remains and the shape of the reaction is very much similar. As far the
credit spread on prime rates is concerned, here also the short-term reaction is not
very di¤erent. More surprisingly, after six months, the reaction in the low regime is
lower than the one in high regime. All in all, when regimes are determined according
to the stage of the business cycle, there is indeed evidence for asymmetry, but not
totally in accordance to the theory exposed previously.
Conclusions shift substantially when looking at the reaction when regimes are
determined by variables directly linked to cash ‡ows. Figure 10 plot the reaction
with regimes de…ned according to high and low levels of cash ‡ows. Looking …rst at
the reaction of industrial production, one observes that the reaction is substantially
di¤erent in the short-term. Whereas in the high regime, just like in the full sample,
industrial production rises for a few months initially, it declines immediately and
substantially in the low regime. It is only after a few months that the reaction
becomes similarly negative. This is indeed largely corroborated by the reaction of
credit spreads. For credit spreads on long-term bonds, the divergence in the reaction
is much more pronounced, at least in the short-term, than it was the case when
regimes were determined by the stage of the business cycle. Indeed, after about
three months, the spread has already increased considerably in the low regime by
about 3 to 4 basis points, whereas it is still almost unchanged after six months in
the high regime. Over the long-term, the discrepancy tends to diminish but remains
nonetheless present. The same kind of observation can be made about short-term
spreads. The prime rate spread jumps by about 30 basis points after four months
in the low regime. In the high regime, the increase is only 10 basis points after six
months. After one year however, the reaction tends to equalize over the regimes.
The case when regimes are determined by the level of dividends in …gure 11
is equally interesting. By observing …rst the reaction of industrial production, we
see that there is also a substantial di¤erence in the reaction. However, the di¤erence
happens more inthe medium to long-term this time. As a matter of fact, the reaction
is almost identical until six months witha rapid initial rise and thena more important
move downward. But the reaction di¤ers substantially after this period of time. In
the low regime, industrial production continues to decline more severely, loosing one
full percentage point at the bottom and still importanly on the down side after two
years. In the high regime, the fall in activity becomes smaller so that industrial
production is not declining anymore after twenty months. Again, those observations
are strongly con…rmed by the reaction of credit spreads. When looking …rst at the
long-term credit spread, we can note that the initial reaction is not di¤erent across
regimes. Yet, after about …ve months, large discrepancies start to appear. In the low
regime, the reaction is the largest after 10 to 15 months with the spread increasing by
almost 10basis points while in the highregime, the maximumreaction is reachedafter
195 to 10 months with an increase of slightly more than 3 basis points. The di¤erence
remains large even after 20 months. Same observations for spreads on short-term
rates, where the divergencies start to appear after 3 to 4 months. The peak in the
low regime exceeds 25 basis points after 6 months.
Things become more di¢cult to interpret when turning to the case where regimes
are determined by stock returns on …gure 12. As far as the reaction of industrial
production is concerned on the top chart of …gure 12, the …rst conclusion that comes
to one mind is that the reaction is considerably more volatile in the low regime. In
fact, the reactionisstrongerboth on the upside in the short-termandonthedownside
in thelong-term. Evidence oncredit spreads is also mixed. While the creditspread on
short-term rates displays almost no di¤erence in reaction, the evolution of the long-
term credit spreads do indeed showsome di¤erence. The case is somewhat in contrast
with previous observations since the reaction is stronger in the high regime. In the
low regime, credit spreads even decline in the …rst 4 months. Afterwards, reactions
tend to equalize and, after 15 months, the increase is again larger for the low regime.
Therefore, only the long-term reaction is in line with the intuition provided by the
credit channel.
Finally, one can observe on …gure 13 the reaction of the variables when regimes
are determined by the use of the Boschen-Mills index of monetary policy. The high
regime is associated with positive values of the index, i.e. when monetary policy
is expansive. Conversely, the low regime re‡ects negative values of the index, i.e.
when monetary policy is tight. Even though the di¤erence in the reactions might
be less striking than in the cases of cash ‡ows or dividends, there are still some
interesting features to observe. On the top chart of …gure 13, we can note that, in the
high regime, it takes approximately six months for industrial production to become
negative. Moreover, at this point it hovers around zero rather than being markedly
negative. Inversely, in the low regime, the reaction is quickly negative and remains
so for a long period of time. In the low regime, the reaction is indeed very close to
the one of the full sample. Evidence is mixed as far as credit spreads are concerned.
On long-term bonds, the initial reaction is positive and stronger in the low regime.
However, this does not hold very long and the reaction is marginally stronger for the
high regime in the long-term. The behavior of the credit spread on prime rates is
more in accordance with our model. The reaction is both larger and more persistent
when monetary conditions are tight.
5.3 Discussion
In our opinion, the results described in the previous section allows to raise some
doubts about the stability over time of the traditional impulse-response functions
such as the one described in Christiano et al. [12]. This means that one should be
very cautious in interpreting those responses and in particular should be aware that
thosemight shift considerably over time. Furthermore, these results are in accordance
20with the intuition provided by the credit channel of monetary policy. As a matter of
fact, the increase in credit spreads after a contraction of monetary policy is already a
hint that the external …nance premium is reacting substantially to monetary shocks.
Therefore, the results on the full sample con…rm the conclusion derived from …gure 1,
namely that the slope ofthe supply offunds curve becomes steeper with acontraction
of monetary policy.
What the results using the threshold model show is that the reaction to monetary
policy is even stronger in periods when the …nancial situation of …rms is deteriorated,
whereas it is closer to the baseline case when …rms are less constrained. This con-
…rms indeed the intuition of …gure 2 where the upward move in the supply curve is
more pronounced in periods of …nancial constraint. These periods are identi…ed in
particular when cash ‡ows are low or when dividends are low. As a matter of fact,
this is a time-series con…rmation of results derived previously by Fazzary, Hubbard
and Petersen [18]. It is striking to note how these results di¤er from the case where
regimes are identi…ed through the stage of the business cycle. It seems thus that the
level of cash ‡ows or the level of dividends are a better proxy for the …nancial health
of companies than is the stage of the business cycle.
Moreover, it also appears that stock market returns are not as valuable in pro-
viding hints on the extent that …rms are …nancially constrained. Responses are only
partially in accordance to the intuition of the credit channel. The fact that only
the long-term response is more conform to what we expected might be due to the
leading indicator property of stock returns. Because of this feature, it might be that
periods of low stock returns indeed anticipate times where …rms will be …nancially
constrained. Inthis case, …rms will become constrained only a few months after stock
returns have declined, so that only the long-term response of industrial production
and spreads are really impacted by the tightening.
Finally, results using the Boschen-Mills index show that periods when monetary
policy is tight also re‡ect periods of low net worth to some extent. This goes very
much in the same direction as results derived for instance by Garcia and Schaller [24]
or Choi [11].
6 Conclusion
Thecredit channel ofmonetarypolicy implies thatmonetary policy has varyinge¤ects
not only ona cross-sectional basis, but also over time. Indeed, inperiods during which
companies are more …nancially constrained, the economy should be more sensitive to
a tightening of monetary policy and therefore react stronger. This should be re‡ected
in the reaction of both output and the external …nance premium. The objective of
this paper is …rst to investigate whether this asymmetry over time in the reaction
to monetary policy is con…rmed. In a second step, we try to identify what is the
best variable to use in order to determine the periods during which …rms are more
…nancially constrained.
21For this purpose, we use a Threshold VAR model based on the structural VAR
set forth by authors in order to look at the reaction of the economy to monetary
policy. Our model, however, allows for non-linearities over time in the reaction of
the variables to the various shocks. Following the intuition provided by previous
papers on the credit channel, we use …ve di¤erent variables in order to di¤erentiate
the level of …nancial constraint. Those variables are industrial production, cash-‡ows,
dividends, stock returns and the Boschen-Mills index of monetary policy.
Our results showthatthe reactionofboth industrial productionandcredit spreads
varies over time according to the di¤erent regimes of …nancial constraint. Conse-
quently, the tests con…rm the intuition of the credit channel according to which …rms
are more a¤ected by a monetary tightening in periods where the …nancial situation
is already stretched. Moreover, the evidence is particularly strong for the case where
we use cash-‡ows or dividends as a switching variable. Conversely, results are less
convincing, albeit still positive, for the other variables. It seems therefore that the
level of cash-‡ows or dividends are a good proxy in order to determine the level of
…nancial constraint of the economy.
One of the most important implication of this paper is that traditional impulse-
responses computed in VAR system in order to look at the reaction of the economy
to a monetary shock must be considered with caution. We show that those responses
might mask substantial shifts over time. These shifts seem to be function of the
…nancial conditions of the economy.
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26Mean Median Max Min St. dev. 33% 66%
CF 7.76 7.99 24.56 -11.32 7.16 5.12 11.42
DIV 8.40 8.24 23.03 -6.23 5.03 6.58 10.83
SP 7.70 9.47 42.49 -53.44 14.33 3.16 14.58
IP 3.43 4.25 12.56 -13.41 4.64 2.23 5.68
Table 1: summary statistics for switching variables expressed in annual percent
changes
March 1959 December 1965 December 1968 April 1974
August 1978 October 1979 December 1988 November 1994
Table 2: Romer dates. Episodes of monetary tightening (the last date was computed
by the author on the basis of the Boschen-Mills index of monetary policy)
Average length in months
Threshold variable Threshold level Number of lows Lows Highs
IP 0.05 13 7.1 32.1
IP 0.22 16 6.6 25.5
CF 4.84 17 9.7 22.3
CF 5.12 18 9.5 20.7
DIV 10.54 15 22.0 14.1
SP -0.18 19 6.9 21.5
BM 0 12 14.0 29.3
Table 3: Characterization of regimes as determined by threshold variables
27Thresh old variable Eq. in cludin g SupW Prob ExpW Prob AveW Prob Threshold
CF CSBMA 3.9623 0.000 1.3177 0.000 2.5658 0.000 4.84
CSPRI 3.4472 0.000 1.4091 0.000 2.7700 0.000 4.84
IP 2.5722 0.001 0.9671 0.003 1.8873 0.004 5.12
DIV CSBMA 3.4519 0.000 1.5424 0.000 3.0229 0.000 10.54
CSPRI 4.2798 0.000 1.8500 0.000 3.6239 0.000 10.53
IP 2.4747 0.006 1.0203 0.004 2.0163 0.005 10.56
SP CSBMA 4.1203 0.000 1.7900 0.000 3.5603 0.000 -0.18
CSPRI 3.7654 0.000 1.2897 0.000 2.5115 0.000 -0.18
IP 2.3251 0.010 0.8348 0.030 1.6432 0.033 -0.18
IP CSBMA 2.8299 0.000 1.1255 0.000 2.2174 0.000 0.05
CSPRI 3.1166 0.000 1.3277 0.000 2.6034 0.000 0.22
Table 4: linerarity tests and value of thresholds for equations containing industrial
production and credit spreads
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Figure 1: The credit channel of monetary policy
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Figure 3: Fed funds shocks : residuals from six-variables VAR including industrial
production in …rst position. Shaded areas are NBER recession periods and straigth
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Figure 4: Threshold variables (annual changes in percent). Shaded areas are NBER
recession periods and straigth lines are Romer & Romer episodes of monetary tight-
ening.
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Figure 6: Credit spread on long-term bonds (CSBMA) with di¤erent regimes in
shaded areas.
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Figure 13: Impulse-response to fed fund shock with regimes determined by Boschen-
Mills index of monetary policy.
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